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K K K Key points: ey points: ey points: ey points:   
• In order to ensure the stability of South East Europe, it is absolutely essential to resolve 
the Kosovo status issue. The proposals submitted by UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari will 
only turn out to be a success if they receive unconditional support from all of the member 
states of the European Union (EU), and if the EU shows its willingness to embark on 
long/term involvement in Kosovo. The German government should use the EU presidency 
in order to formulate a common European position and win over the critical member 
states. A Kosovo with restricted sovereignty can in the long term transform itself from an 
international protectorate into a functioning state only with robust political, financial and 
staffing support from the EU. 
• After a decision on Kosovo has been made public, the EU should pursue a policy of active 
rapprochement between itself and Serbia. 
• In the perceptions of the region, the prospect of EU membership, despite the assurances 
given by the Union, seems to be becoming rather elusive. The debate about the EU’s 
“integration capacity” is increasingly obscuring what the South East European countries 
have achieved with regard to transformation and adaptation. At the same time important 
states such as Serbia have still not developed their own EU strategy. In order to preserve 
the dynamic nature of the rapprochement process, both sides need to pursue it in a more 
active manner. 
• The citizens of the EU need to be informed more effectively about the advantages of EU 
membership for the Balkan countries and the possible consequences of non/membership 
or prolonged deferment. 
• Efforts designed to bring about greater regional cooperation in the Western Balkan states 
must be intensified. Various kinds of cooperation may evolve in other policy areas on the 
basis of a South East European economic area. 
• The self/responsibility of South East European policymakers must be strengthened. The 
international community should transfer competences to local actors wherever this is 
possible. New institutions such as the Regional Cooperation Council should receive 
support, since they can defend the interests of the region, and certain policy areas, once 
they have been communitarized on the regional level, should be integrated into the EU 
before full membership has been attained. 2
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In the follow/up to the Serbian parliamentary elections of 21 January 2007, UN Chief Negotiator 
Martti Ahtisaari will announce his suggestions for a solution of the status issue within the next 
weeks. His proposal will probably amount to conditional independence for Kosovo. After 
Montenegro’s peaceful secession from the state union with Serbia in 2006, another small state 
will start to prepare for membership of the European Union (EU) in the medium term. Whereas 
the international community is beginning increasingly to withdraw from the region, the EU has 
assumed responsibility for more and more tasks and competences. Concurrently, an ownership 
process is being fostered in parts of the region. 
An unambiguous prospect of EU membership is essential in order to create and sustain stability 
in the area. This is the only way of promoting reforms and western/oriented political forces in the 
Balkan countries. It is in the vital interests of the EU and its member states. However, it is not 
only a question of “stability in the immediate neigbourhood.” After the experiences garnered as 
a result of the last round of enlargement, it may be taken for granted that the EU member states 
will derive considerable profit from enlargement in the Balkans. In May 2006 the EU Commission 
issued a very positive account of the 2004 EU enlargement, pointing out that the old member 
states (with one or two exceptions) profited from the growth of the internal market in the shape 
of substantial increases in the levels of trade and investment. Although such fears were 
entertained in certain member states, EU enlargement in Eastern Europe did not lead to dramatic 
migration. Where there was an increased level of immigration, there were no noticeably negative 
effects on the labour market. 
Since 1999 the EU has regularly emphasized that there is a prospect of membership for the 
states of the Western Balkans, though it has never defined a specific time frame for possible 
accessions. There is simply too much apprehension that this might weaken the dynamic nature of 
the transformation processes in the countries concerned. However, the prospect of accession in 
the medium term needs to be a realistic one, and must not become a game of never/ending 
deferral and delay. The process must be kept going, and it must be possible to sense the 
dynamic nature of rapprochement on both sides. For this reason it is important that, after the 
resolution of the Kosovo status issue, the two sides should design the steps leading to EU 
membership as effectively as possible, and to accept self/responsibility for the process. Various 
fields of action now become apparent. 
 
Securing International Support for the Ahtisaari Proposals Securing International Support for the Ahtisaari Proposals Securing International Support for the Ahtisaari Proposals Securing International Support for the Ahtisaari Proposals   
The unresolved Kosovo status issue continues to endanger the stability of the whole region. The 
requisite political and social reforms in the countries of South East Europe, not to mention the 
rapprochement process with the EU, are in danger of grinding to a halt as long as the indecision 
about the issue persists. In this situation only a solution which is acceptable to all the 
international actors and the whole of the EU can suggest a way of overcoming the dilemma and 
offering the local actors – above all Serbian policymakers – a reliable frame of reference for 
future/based action. 3
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However, careful thought needs to be given to how the issue can best be resolved. Immediate 
and total independence for Kosovo would probably lead to vocal demands for border changes in 
other states of the region. Thus there might well be a new debate about the still unstable 
statehood of Bosnia/Hercegovina. In Serbia immediate independence for Kosovo might also 
strengthen the role of the Radical Party under Vojislav Seselj, who is currently in custody in The 
Hague. Finally, there are fears that premature secession by Kosovo could serve as an argument 
for other demands for independence elsewhere in the world and, having set a precedence, might 
have unpredictable consequences for international relations. 
A sensible way out of this situation will be indicated by the UN mediator Ahtisaari. His proposals 
will probably comprise restricted sovereignty with an institutional arrangement which guarantees 
the minority rights of the Kosovo Serbs, and a strong international representative. The issue of 
total and internationally recognized sovereignty for Kosovo will once again be on the agenda in a 
few years’ time, if, that is, it has proved possible in the meantime to establish the remaining 
state institutions and to maintain the required standards. 
While NATO will continue to deploy peacekeeping troops to Kosovo, the EU will assume many of 
the responsibilities hitherto in the hands of the UN, above all in the areas of policing and the 
establishment and supervision of the rule of law. Whereas it is true that a strong international 
presence will continue to be necessary in Kosovo, the international representative should not be 
given far/reaching powers of intervention. The example of Bosnia/Hercegovina demonstrates 
that, as a result of interventions by the High Representative, the political elites have failed to 
develop much of a sense of responsibility. From the very beginning an attempt should be made 
to give the Kosovars enough room for manoeuvre so that they themselves can determine as 
much of their political life as possible. 
If the Ahtisaari proposals are to be a success, a precondition is that there should be a visible 
desire on the part of the EU to make Kosovo “fit for Europe” in order to prevent it from slipping 
into permanent stagnation as an EU mandated area. Thus the deployment of financial and 
human resources by the EU must be both purposeful and strategic. 
 
A Key Role for Germany A Key Role for Germany A Key Role for Germany A Key Role for Germany   
Over the next few weeks a key role will be played by the German government. A status decision 
will probably be made public during the time of the German EU presidency. Furthermore, two of 
the most important international positions in Kosovo are held by Germans, Joachim Rücker, the 
head of the UN administration, and Roland Kather, the commander of NATO’s peacekeeping 
troops. If there is a crisis, they bear the responsibility for dealing with it. Since it is feared that 
reverberations from the status decision will also be felt in Bosnia/Hercegovina, Christian 
Schwarz/Schilling, High Representative for Bosnia/Hercegovina, and Jochen Witthauer, 
commander of the EU Force in Bosnia/Hercegovina will also play an important role. The German 
government should agree unequivocally to Ahtisaari’s proposals, should strive for a common EU 4
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position (especially in the case of the critical member states, Spain, Greece and Romania), and 
should be willing to take all the necessary measures to ensure that there is no violent rioting. 
As the process continues, it will be important to draw Serbia as close to the EU as possible so 
that, in the wake of the Kosovo decision, the radical elements do not gain enduring support. This 
will include making certain concessions in order to resume the negotiations on a stabilization 
and association agreement at an early date. For example, it might perhaps be conceivable to 
make complete cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
imperative only at a later stage of the stabilization and association process (this would also apply 
to Bosnia/Hercegovina). In this way cooperation with The Hague could come about more quickly 
than is currently anticipated. However, such a step would have to be explained to the politicians 
and the public in the EU member states in order to obviate unjustified suspicions that the 
intention was to reduce the scope of the mandate of the court in The Hague. 
 
Making the Prospect of Membership More Credible Making the Prospect of Membership More Credible Making the Prospect of Membership More Credible Making the Prospect of Membership More Credible   
According to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, all European states have the fundamental right to apply 
for membership of the EU as soon as they are in compliance with the (Copenhagen) criteria. In 
1999 the EU first extended the prospect of membership to the Western Balkan states, and 
reiterated this at the meeting of the European Council in Thessalonika in 2003. At that time, of 
course, the debate about an independent Kosovo still played a fairly insignificant role. It is true 
that later declarations also state that there is still a prospect of membership. However, the 
increasing emphasis on the criterion of what is known as “integration capacity” has led the 
potential candidates to ask some pointed questions. 
In fact, the treaties now in force and the institutional structure of the EU do not envisage any 
accessions beyond the current 27 members. If the EU is serious about the prospect of 
membership it has repeatedly extended, certain changes will have to be made, with or without a 
European constitution. It is not enough to keep pointing to requisite changes in integration 
capacity.  
The difficult final phase of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria is one of the reasons why the 
EU will in future only announce the dates of accession shortly before the end of the negotiations. 
However, it should be made clear to the states and the people in South East Europe that their 
efforts have not gone unnoticed and that they are leading to a goal. The EU should keep making 
it clear that the criteria are immutable and that they will not be modified or changed in the 
course of the process. Membership should in fact be possible by the year 2014 (as has often 
been suggested) if the criteria have been met. 
At the same time it is up to the South East European countries to promote the process to the 
best of their abilities in a responsible and purposeful manner. If there is really a genuine interest 
in becoming part of the EU, policymakers, above all in Serbia and Bosnia/Hercegovina, must 
demonstrate more of a home/grown sense of responsibility. A specific EU strategy, as is 5
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evidenced in the case of Croatia and Macedonia, is obviously useful in the process of moving 
closer to the EU. 
 
Winning over EU  Winning over EU  Winning over EU  Winning over EU C C C Citizens for the  itizens for the  itizens for the  itizens for the E E E Enlargement  nlargement  nlargement  nlargement P P P Process rocess rocess rocess 
Whereas almost all EU governments continue to emphasize that they will adhere to the prospect 
of EU membership in the medium term, it is becoming more difficult to explain the advantages to 
a population which is increasingly “tired of enlargement.” According to a Eurobarometer survey 
conducted in July 2006, only 45% of EU citizens are still in favour of further enlargement, 
whereas 42% are now against it. In the autumn of 2005 this figure was still 39%. Furthermore, 
an increasing number of politicians, such as the Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, or the 
French Interior Minister and presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, are openly calling for an end 
to the accession process (with the possible exception of Croatia). 
Yet a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation published in September 2006 demonstrates that EU 
citizens view the prospects for EU enlargement realistically. A majority fully expects further 
rounds of enlargement by the year 2020.  
With regard to the problem of enlargement, it is the task of policymakers to address the open 
contradiction between “tired” and “realistic” attitudes, and to change the whole tone of the 
debate. Member states such as Austria, Hungary, Greece and Italy, which border on the region, 
or which, like Germany, maintain links and contacts with the countries in question, bear a 
particular responsibility. 
The population of France could turn out to be a real obstacle for future EU enlargement. In 
February 2005, in the midst of the heated debates preceding the referendum on the EU 
Constitution, the French National Assembly passed an amendment to the French constitution 
which states that every enlargement which did not receive the assent of the European Council 
before 1 July 2004 can be ratified only on the basis of a referendum in France. However, the 
entry into force of the new Article 88/5 is conditional on the ratification of the current EU 
constitutional treaty.   
EU citizens need to be given more information about the significance of the accession of the 
states of the Western Balkans. The consequences (and the cost) of denying membership to the 
region should be borne in mind, especially against the background of the ethnic and political 
tensions, which could easily lead to new conflicts and bloodshed. It could also lead to a 
weakening of the political forces which are in favour of reform, to economic stagnation, and to a 
lack of investment. Enlargement is in the strategic interests of the EU. 
It is of crucial importance to portray the region as a self/evident part of Europe. There are no 
immediately obvious reasons why South East Europeans should be excluded permanently from 
the integration process. It also needs to be emphasized that, whilst the inhabitants of the 
Western Balkans will of course profit from EU membership, they will also have to bear the brunt 
of the social consequences of the transformation process, and this should not be 6
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underestimated. The population of the “old” EU should be made aware of the fact that EU 
enlargement is something positive. Once the states of the Western Balkans have fulfilled the 
criteria, it would be tragic if, after concluding the necessary negotiations, they were at the last 
minute to be barred from obtaining EU membership, for example, as a result of a French 
referendum. 
 
Strengthening Regional Cooperation Strengthening Regional Cooperation Strengthening Regional Cooperation Strengthening Regional Cooperation   
There should be much greater regional cooperation, which is one of the aims of the Stability Pact 
for South East Europe. The EU regards intensified regional cooperation as a sign that the 
countries concerned are able to establish and maintain close relations with the Union. Such 
cooperation pertains not only to economic issues, but to many other areas. For example, the EU 
expects the various countries to cooperate more closely in the fight against organized crime. 
Bearing in mind what it experienced in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU, when it next 
embarks on enlargement, will scrutinize very closely the actual progress that has been made in 
these areas.  
In the region matters are complicated by the fact that there are fears that the European Union’s 
efforts to establish a regional economic area amount to an alternative to EU membership. Thus 
they are frequently interpreted as an attempt to revive the former Yugoslavia. For this reason 
there needs to be a stronger perception in the Western Balkans of the fact that regional 
integration and the creation of a regional economic area is advantageous to all the countries 
concerned, and that it leads towards the EU and not away from it. 
Against this background the signing of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) by the 
states of the Western Balkans in December 2006 was a step in the right direction. It simplified 
the complicated trade system between the states in the region, which had consisted of 31 
bilateral trade agreements. In addition to deepening trade links, CEFTA will probably raise the 
region’s extremely low export levels, and create greater incentives for direct investments. Trade 
in services and the protection of property rights should be strengthened as soon as possible. The 
progressive introduction of internal market regulations will prepare all of the participating states 
for EU membership. 
How this economic area might one day be incorporated into the EU is clearly exemplified by the 
Energy Community South East Europe (ECSEE), which was founded in October 2005. In this 
energy pact, which resembles the foundation of the ECSC, EU guidelines will be implemented in 
the area of energy, and there is to be a stepwise liberalization of the energy market. In this way 
a common internal market for electricity and natural gas in which the EU and South East Europe 
are fully integrated will materialize by 2015. This example demonstrates the extent to which the 
EU could profit from regional integration. For the EU states new market opportunities arise from 
the fact that the Balkan states are abolishing their state monopolies. 7
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It is to be expected that the abolition of trade barriers will lead not only an increase in the 
volume of trade, but also and increasingly to reforms in other policy areas. Certain kinds of 
cooperation are already in progress. For example, at the behest of the EU the five SAP countries 
acting within the framework of the Ohrid Border Process are currently working on an integrated 
kind of border management based on European standards. The abolition of travel restrictions is 
designed to promote economic development and the normalization of relations between the 
nations in the region. 
Certain events in the recent past demonstrate that relations between states and people in the 
region continue to be burdened by the legacy of the past. Whereas it is true that there were 
official apologies for human rights violations committed during the war years, the diplomatic 
friction between Croatia and Serbia occasioned by a video (which came to light in August 2006) 
documenting crimes committed during Operation Storm, a Croatian military offensive during the 
fighting in Yugoslavia, shows that there are many things about which the truth still needs to be 
told. 
 
Strengthening Self Strengthening Self Strengthening Self Strengthening Self/ / / /Responsibility Responsibility Responsibility Responsibility   
For some time the international community has been working at the transfer of responsibility to 
local actors. In May 2006 it was decided that in future the countries of South East Europe acting 
within the framework of the regional cooperation council (RCC) will be permitted to chair the 
Stability Pact themselves. A Secretary General is to be elected in March, and he or she will be a 
well/known politician from the region. Whereas the RCC secretariat should be responsible for the 
coordination of the various policy areas in the region, its Secretary General should occupy a key 
position in the relations between the Western Balkans and the EU. As the representative of the 
region, the Secretary General’s role should resemble Javier Solana’s position in the foreign 
relations of the EU. The members of the RCC could thus speak with one voice when they are 
dealing with the EU, and function far more effectively in Brussels as a group. 
However, the EU should not only promote the establishment of institutions such as this. It must 
also reconsider the way in which it provides financial assistance to the states of the Western 
Balkans. From a financial point of view the countries seeking admission derive very little profit 
from the conclusion of an SAA. It is only when they attain candidate status that the EU’s pre/
accession grants are increased to a level which makes it possible to start to work towards the 
economic and social standards of the EU. At the same time the EU Commission participates 
actively in the development of institutions and procedures which the countries will need as EU 
member states. The process of “member state building” should actually start at an earlier stage. 
Such simple steps will on the one hand enable the EU to demonstrate in a far more visible 
manner that it is interested in the region. On the other hand, such institutions and their adoption 
of EU legal norms can be of use in the establishment of a regional economic area. 
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Moving Ahead with Functional Integration Moving Ahead with Functional Integration Moving Ahead with Functional Integration Moving Ahead with Functional Integration   
It is true that the EU Commission has emphasized that another round of enlargement in which 
several states are admitted simultaneously seems highly unlikely. However, if the countries of the 
region begin increasingly to make common progress, it remains to be seen whether the EU might 
wish to modify its present position, and whether, as in 2004, there will be a another substantial 
round of enlargement. 
In order to be “on the same level” in the negotiations it would be advantageous if the states of 
the Western Balkans possessed a regional economic zone with various integrated policy areas. 
This would help the chair of the RCC to make his case. This process could be taken a step 
further. For example, it might perhaps be possible to integrate the states into certain EU policy 
areas as soon as these have been “communitarized” on the regional level before they acquire 
full EU membership. As in the case of Norway or Iceland (even though in their case the initial 
preconditions were different), the countries concerned could then be incorporated into the EU 
institutional structures in various areas. If this status were also to include the right to limited 
decision/shaping in less sensitive policy areas, it would constitute a great incentive for regional 
integration. In the preparatory phase the EU could grant the states permanent observer status in 
EU committees. 
A very effective (in the short term) and widely discussed measure designed to diminish the 
feeling among the inhabitants of the Western Balkans that they are being excluded from Europe 
would be the simplification of visa regulations. Such measures are currently being planned by the 
EU Commission and were welcomed by the European Council in December 2006. However, they 
are restricted to students, researchers and businessmen. The categories of people to whom these 
privileges apply should be much wider from the very beginning. If the EU wishes to act as a 
model for greater regional cooperation, it must be made much easier for everyone in South East 
Europe to become acquainted with the European Union. This presupposes the effective 
implementation of repatriation agreements on the part of the Western Balkan states and is thus  
another way of increasing mutual trust. 
 